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Abstract  
Internalists in epistemology think that whether one possesses epistemic statuses such as 
knowledge or justification depends on factors that are internal to one; externalists think 
that whether one possesses these statuses can depend on factors that are external to one. 
In this chapter we focus on the relationship between externalism and epistemic relativism. 
Externalism isn’t straightforwardly incompatible with epistemic relativism but, as we’ll see, 
it is very common to hold that key externalist insights block or undermine some standard 
arguments for epistemic relativism. Our aim in this chapter is to give a broad overview of 
why externalism poses a problem for standard arguments for relativism. But we also want 
to discuss some—admittedly less developed—ways in which some externalist ideas might 




Internalists in epistemology think that whether one possesses epistemic statuses such as 
knowledge or justification depends on factors that are internal to one; externalists think 
that whether one possesses these statuses can depend on factors that are external to one.i 
We can complicate this distinction in several ways. What it means for a factor to be 
“internal” or “external” to one is subject to debate. One might be an internalist about some 
epistemic statuses (e.g. justification) but not others (e.g. knowledge). For the purposes of 
this chapter we set these issues aside and focus on the relationship between externalism 
and epistemic relativism, which is, roughly, the view that epistemic statuses like justification 
and knowledge are themselves always relative to some non-trivial parameter, such as local 






Externalism isn’t straightforwardly incompatible with epistemic relativism but, as we’ll see, 
it is very common to hold that key externalist insights block or undermine some standard 
arguments for epistemic relativism. Our aim in this chapter is to give a broad overview of 
why externalism poses a problem for standard arguments for relativism. But we also want 
to discuss some ways in which externalist ideas might provide support for certain forms of 
epistemic relativism. We start with externalist arguments against relativism. We then move 
on to some ways in which externalist ideas might provide support for various forms of 
relativism. We finish with suggestions for future work. 
 
2 Externalist arguments against relativism  
 
Arguments for epistemic relativism often take, as a starting point, an observation that the 
absolutist—the epistemic relativist’s opponent—can happily concede: cultures that differ 
across both geography and time can (and do) differ with respect to what epistemic 
standards they appeal to when determining whether a given belief is justified or known.  
 
But what follows from this? A moment’s reflection reveals that not all of these standards 
can be (absolutely) true because some are ostensibly in conflict with one another. And this 
observation is philosophically significant. For if one thinks that there are (absolutely) correct 
epistemic standards, then it is incumbent upon one—at least, insofar as one wishes to avoid 
scepticism—to establish that one’s own epistemic standards are the right ones.  
 
But how to do that, exactly? At this juncture, it will be helpful to consider two famous 
argument strategies for relativism that utilise these observations—the argument from 
circularity and the argument from non-neutrality. Externalism, we will then show, offers the 
absolutist a straightforward way to nip each of these arguments for relativism in the bud. 
That said, in each case we will also show why the relativist might not find the externalist 






2.1 Externalism as a response to the argument from circularity  
 
Establishing that one’s own epistemic standards are the right ones can be difficult. This is 
especially so when one’s dialectical opponent does not already accept these same 
standards. In fact, some argue the very attempt to demonstrate that one’s own epistemic 
standards have a positive epistemic status (in comparison with alternative, competing 
standards) plays into the hands of the relativist. Michael Williams puts the idea nicely in this 
passage:  
 
In determining whether a belief – any belief – is justified, we always rely, implicitly or 
explicitly, on an epistemic framework: some standards or procedures that separate 
justified from unjustified convictions. But what about the claims embodied in the 
framework itself: are they justified? In answering this question, we inevitably apply 
our own epistemic framework. So, assuming that our framework is coherent and 
does not undermine itself, the best we can hope for is a justification that is 
epistemically circular, employing our epistemic framework in support of itself. Since 
this procedure can be followed by anyone, whatever his epistemic framework, all 
such frameworks, provided they are coherent, are equally defensible (or 
indefensible) (2007, 3-4). 
 
This reasoning—call it the argument from circularity—offers a powerful argument for 
epistemic relativism because it purports to show how all epistemic frameworks (and thus, 
all the epistemic standards that make up these frameworks) are ultimately on an equal 
footing. None aspires to anything more than epistemically circular justification, including the 
frameworks made up of the standards that we think have the most going for them, 
epistemically.  
 
Consider, against the background of this puzzle, what the epistemic externalist might say. In 
order to sharpen things a bit, let’s imagine a special case of the argument from circularity 
that purports to show that all standards for epistemic justification are on an equal footing. 
And let’s look, specifically, at what the externalist about epistemic justification can say in 





onlyiii factors that matter for whether one is justified are internal factors—viz., factors that 
are accessible to one via reflection alone.iv  
 
In the face of the argument from circularity (targeting epistemic justification), the 
externalist about justification has a two-step reply: step one involves a disambiguation and 
step two involves rejecting on the basis of this disambiguation a premise of the argument 
from circularity. The disambiguation proceeds as follows: a justification for a standard for 
epistemic justification can be read in multiple ways. On one reading, X is a justification for 
epistemic standard E only if X can be adduced as a reason in favour of E. Notice how 
something like this reading of “justification” lies in the background of the argument Williams 
sketches in the above passage when he indicates that (by the relativist’s lights) “the best we 
can hope for is a justification that is epistemically circular”.  
 
For the externalist, by contrast, E’s being justified simply doesn’t require a justification in 
this sense. Take, for example, standard process reliabilism according to which justification is 
entirely a matter of reliable belief production: a belief is justified iff it is reliably produced.v 
From the perspective of the reliabilist, a justification (in the sense at issue in Williams’ 
passage) for E isn’t required for E to be justified. All that is required is that certain reliability 
facts about E obtain. And the obtaining of these facts needn’t require anyone appealing to 
any standard in order to make them true. In slogan form: facts about justification are 
independent from facts about the activity of justifying; the former are not grounded in the 
latter.  
 
We’re in a position to see now why externalism-cum-reliabilism about justification offers 
the anti-relativist a way to nip the argument from circularity in the bud. For the argument 
from circularity trades on what happens when we try to justify our own epistemic system. 
And, as we’ve just seen, the reliabilist is in a position to challenge the argument “upstream” 
by simply denying the epistemological significance of justifying for justification.  
 
We’ve suggested that the relativist might not find the externalist reply to the above 
argumentative strategy persuasive. One reason why is as follows: the relativist who 





reliabilism is true) we needn’t in ordinary practice justify our own epistemic standards by 
appealing to them in order to be justified, it is incumbent upon the reliabilist qua theorist to 
vindicate her beliefs as justified beliefs, and her standards as justified standards. If the 
reliabilist qua theorist wants to do this in an adequate way, then it is not enough that the 
reliabilist merely be justified in her beliefs or for that matter in her standards, but she must 
be able, in addition, to provide an adequate explanation for why they are justified.vi And it is 
at this point that it looks as though the theorist who embraces an externalist view like 
reliabilism will, in the course of this kind of vindicatory project, inevitably appeal to her own 
standards in the course of justifying them.vii  
 
2.2 Externalism as a response to the argument from non-neutrality 
 
We will now turn to the argument from non-neutrality (e.g., Rorty 1980; Hales 2014). 
Perhaps the most famous example of this kind of argument strategy owes to Richard Rorty 
(1980), who develops the argument with reference to the historical dispute between 
Cardinal Bellarmine and Galileo.viii What was principally at issue between the two disputants 
was the matter of the truth of geocentrism, the doctrine that the Earth is the geographical 
centre of the Universe. As Bellarmine saw things, the doctrine was true, and he believed it 
to be true on the basis of Scripture. Galileo, by contrast, concluded that the doctrine was 
false. His reasoning was that, on the basis of telescopic evidence, he could observe moons 
orbiting Jupiter, a phenomenon that is better explained by the heliocentric model than the 
geocentric model. Moreover, Galileo took the evidence he received from the telescope to 
not only favour the heliocentric model over the geocentric model, but also to indicate that 
Scripture was not a reliable source of evidence about the movement of celestial bodies. 
Bellarmine, for his part, took the authority of Scripture to indicate that Galileo’s telescopic 
evidence must be mistaken.  
 
As Rorty saw it, the dialectical situation we find in this kind of dispute—viz., where there is 
both a (i) first-order disagreement about what is so, and (ii) an intractable kind of meta-
disagreement about what even counts as suitable evidence that would bear on whether 





to scientific standards, Bellarmine is right according to Scriptural standards, and there is no 
further sense in which things here can be adjudicated.ix 
 
There are a variety of ways one might attempt to respond to this kind of argument from an 
anti-relativistic perspective.x But perhaps the most straightforward strategy belongs to the 
epistemic externalist. For if the externalist (e.g., the reliabilist) is correct, then a central 
premise of Rorty’s argument from non-neutrality is simply undercut. Rorty’s diagnosis 
appeals implicitly to the idea (which he does not explicitly defend) that there can be a (non-
relative) resolution of the dispute concerning the existence of the moons only if there is 
some kind of suitably neutral, shared epistemic standard that Bellarmine and Galileo could 
appeal to in order to adjudicate their dispute (something Rorty thinks there is not).xi  
 
The externalist is now in a position to respond: whether or not Bellarmine or Galileo is 
epistemically justified in believing either the first-order celestial claim at issue or the 
second-order claim about which kind of evidence is relevant to adjudicating the first-order 
issue, is itself entirely orthogonal to the matter of whether the two parties can find any 
common ground. If either side in fact has reliably formed beliefs, then these beliefs are 
justified, otherwise not. A broader point can be gleaned here: to the extent that 
considerations to do with “deep disagreements” (such as the Bellarmine/Galileo dispute) 
are taken to be evidence for epistemic relativism, the externalist has a principled reason to 
disagree. In slogan form, the factors that make you justified will continue to make you 
justified even when other people think they don’t (and even if you are unable to rationally 
persuade them by their own lights that they do). 
 
Does the relativist sympathetic to Rorty’s non-neutrality argument have a reply here? It 
turns out they do, though it will ultimately be a dangerous one to rely upon. The first step in 
the reply is to appeal to the plausibility of a position known in the peer disagreement 
literature as conciliationism.xii According to conciliationism, if you find that someone who 
you previously regarded as your epistemic peer disagrees with you about p, then you are 
rationally required to downgrade your confidence that p is true. To the extent that 
conciliationism offers a plausible way to think about the epistemic significance of 





right, the relativist is in a position to ‘revive’ the pro-relativist import of deep disagreements 
against the externalist.  
 
Here is the idea, in outline: Given the prevalence of disagreement about philosophical views, 
including views about epistemic standards (such as the kind of view the 
externalist/reliabilist is advancing), conciliationism seems to lead to widespread agnosticism 
about epistemic standards if absolutism is assumed. Granted, the absolutist can avoid the 
agnostic result by rejecting conciliationism and accepting that each party to the 
disagreement can rationally hold their ground. In this way, widespread disagreement about 
epistemic standards (something the externalist should be willing to countenance) wouldn’t 
imply agnosticism about those very standards.  However, it follows from this view—non-
conciliationism—that disagreeing with someone you think is just as likely to be right as you 
isn’t something that will be epistemically significant for you even when you both think only 
one of you can be right. Forced with a choice between (i) the hard-line non-conciliationist 
option, (ii) wholesale agnosticism about epistemic standards; and (iii) the denial that at most 
one party to a dispute can be right, the relativist suggests the third option should look the 
most attractive to the (non-sceptical) externalist. For by denying that at most one party can 
be right, the threat of scepticism about epistemic standards is off the table for the 
externalist who grants that at least some epistemic peers deny externalism.  
 
We flagged that the above reply is a potentially dangerous one for the relativist to rely on. 
Here is why. The argument relies on two points the proponent of externalism is in a position 
to contest. Firstly, the externalist might claim that, if they encountered someone who they 
previously regarded as an epistemic peer, but who denied externalism, they would rightly 
no longer view that individual as an epistemic peer. Secondly, even if the previous response 
is not a viable one, the argument goes through only if relativism should be thought more 
attractive to the externalist than should the package of absolutism, conciliationism and 
scepticism, or the package of absolutism and non-conciliationism. And it’s far from clear 






3 Externalist arguments for relativism 
 
As we have just seen, externalist views in epistemology are often taken to undercut support 
for relativism. But one can also argue that externalist views provide support for certain 
forms of relativism. In this section we will review some of these arguments. Throughout the 
focus will be on a particular externalist view: (process) reliabilism.  
 
3.1 Doxastic vs. propositional justification 
 
Put roughly, some subject S’s belief that p is propositionally justified iff S has good reasons 
for believing that p. But S may be aware of good reasons for believing p yet not believe p on 
the basis of those reasons (or S may not believe p at all). Imagine Catriona is aware of good 
reasons for believing that it will rain later (she has read a reliable forecast), but she doesn’t 
believe that it will rain on the basis of the forecast, but rather on the basis of superstition 
(“red sky at dawn, shepherd’s warning”). Catriona’s belief is propositionally justified, but it 
isn’t doxastically justified, because it isn’t believed on the basis of good reasons. The 
problem with Catriona’s belief is that it wasn’t formed in the right sort of way.  
 
In his classic 1979 paper “What is Justified Belief?”, Alvin Goldman proposed a reliabilist 
theory of justification on which (put roughly) S’s belief that p is (doxastically) justified iff it is 
formed in the right sort of way, and a belief is formed in the right sort of way iff it is 
produced by a reliable process. Goldman’s theory treats doxastic justification (in Goldman’s 
terms, “ex post justification”) as the primary notion, and defines propositional justification 
(which Goldman calls “ex ante justification”) in terms of it. S’s belief that p is doxastically 
justified iff it is produced by a reliable process, and then it is propositionally justified for S at 
some time t iff S’s total cognitive state at t is such that S could come to be doxastically 
justified in believing that p. In our earlier example, Catriona’s belief that it will rain is not 
doxastically justified (she formed it on the basis of superstition), but it is propositionally 







While it isn’t often remarked on, this view involves an interesting, albeit mild, form of 
relativism about propositional justification.xiii On Goldman’s theory, whether S has 
propositional justification to believe p is going to depend on a combination of their total 
cognitive state and what propositions they could come to be doxastically justified in 
believing. Two individuals could therefore be aware of precisely the same evidence,xiv yet p 
might be (propositionally) justified for one but not for the other. Imagine Morven, who is 
just like Catriona except she is psychologically incapable of trusting weather forecasts 
because of her deep distrust of the meteorological establishment. As a result, Morven could 
not become doxastically justified in believing that it will rain, because she is psychologically 
incapable of forming this belief in the right way. Thus, for Goldman’s theory, whether S has 
propositional justification is relative not just to their total cognitive state, but also the 
intricacies of their psychological makeup. Goldman’s theory is therefore tantamount to a 
form of psychologism about justification.xv 
 
3.2 Reliability vs. beliefs about reliability 
 
There is another respect in which “What is Justified Belief?” leaves the door open for a form 
of relativism. There may be a difference between which processes count (by the lights of our 
best science) as reliable and which processes are actually reliable. We don’t think that 
wishful thinking is reliable. But imagine that, unbeknownst to us, there is a benevolent 
demon who has recently decided for reasons of their own to make it so that beliefs formed 
through wishful thinking are almost always true. In such a scenario, wishful thinking would 
be a reliable way of forming beliefs, but Goldman doesn’t think this would mean that beliefs 
formed through wishful thinking are justified: 
 
What we really want is an explanation of why we count, or would count, certain 
beliefs as justified and others as unjustified. Such an explanation must refer to our 
beliefs about reliability, not to the actual facts. The reason we count beliefs as 
justified is that they are formed by what we believe to be reliable belief-forming 
processes. Our beliefs about which belief-forming processes are reliable may be 





believe that wishful thinking is an unreliable belief-forming process, we regard 
beliefs formed by wishful thinking as unjustified. What matters, then, is what we 
believe about wishful thinking, not what is true (in the long run) about wishful 
thinking (Goldman 1979, 101) 
 
For Goldman, what confers justification on a given belief is that it is produced by a process 
that we believe to be reliable. While this doesn’t in itself provide support for any form of 
relativism, it does if we add the premise that different communities may (justifiably?) count 
different processes as reliable. The strength of the relativism that results will depend on the 
strength of this premise. The weakest version would just state that, at different points in 
human history, we have counted different processes as reliable (which is not to say that we 
haven’t counted a core set of processes as reliable at all points in human history). On this 
version, we might get interesting results in the debate between Bellarmine and Galileo: 
maybe in Bellarmine’s time it was justifiable to regard Scripture as reliable. A stronger 
version would state that different present-day communities count different processes as 
reliable (which again is not to say that all communities don’t count a core set of processes as 
reliable). Either way, we get a sort of relativity of justification to what counts (and doesn’t 
count) as reliable. 
 
3.3 The generality problem 
 
One central problem for reliabilism is the so-called “generality problem”. We will finish this 
section with Robert Brandom’s (1998) argument that “solving” the generality problem 
requires acknowledging a sort of relativity. 
 
Brandom’s objection targets the claim that reliabilism is a “naturalistic” epistemology.  
But Brandom’s version of the generality problem is meant to show that reliabilism is less 
naturalistic than it seems. The reliabilist holds that whether a token belief is justified 
depends on whether the cognitive process that produced it was sufficiently likely to produce 
a true belief. Consider Alvin. Alvin is looking at a barn in normal conditions and accordingly 





which there are far more fake barns than real barns. But fake barn county is located in real 
barn state, in which there are far more real barns than fakes, and real barn county is located 










Is Alvin’s belief (that there’s a barn in front of him) reliable? Brandom’s point is that it 
depends on which reference class we evaluate for reliability relative to. If we evaluate 
relative to fake barn county or country, it is unreliable (if he had been standing in front of a 
fake, he would still have believed it was a barn). But, if we evaluate relative to real barn 
state, it is reliable. What, then, are we to say then about Alvin? Brandom says: 
 
Which is the correct reference class? Is [Alvin] an objectively reliable identifier of 
barns or not? I submit that the facts as described do not determine an answer. 
Relative to each reference class there is a clear answer, but nothing in the way the 
world is privileges one of those reference classes, and hence picks out one of those 
answers (1998, 386). 
 
Brandom concludes that reliability can only be specified relative to a reference class, and 
there is nothing “in the world” that determines a single reference class as privileged. Thus, 
there is no simple fact of the matter about whether token beliefs like Alvin’s are reliable. 
Relative to some choices of reference class (e.g. real barn state), they are; relative to others 
(e.g. fake barn county or country), they aren’t. 
 
The crucial thing for our purposes is that Brandom does not conclude that reliabilism should 
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because justification cannot be purely a function of the psychological processes that 
produce or preserve belief. Whether a belief is justified depends on whether it is reliable for 
the purposes at hand. As Michael Williams puts the point: 
 
Reliability itself becomes reliability for particular purposes. This is particularly 
evident in sophisticated forms of inquiry. In particle physics, the standard for 
“detecting” a particle has moved from three to five sigma, the standard in effect 
when the discovery of the Higgs boson was announced … This is a very high 
standard, but a reasonable one given that “discoveries” at three sigma – itself a high 
standard – have sometimes turned out to be statistical blips. Reliability is a norm 
that we are not only responsible to but, in certain applications, responsible for 
(Williams 2015, 267–68). 
 
If reliability is a norm that we are responsible for then it may be that what we will require 
for reliability will vary from situation to situation (or community to community). Whether 
the form of relativism that results is benign or not is going to depend on how much (and 
what sort) of variation we are willing to counter. Those who push this point (like Brandom 
and Williams) tend to play down the degree of variation, and so the relativistic 
consequences. But Brandom’s reflections on the generality problem leave the door open for 
radical forms of relativism, on which different communities are free to decide on the level of 




We will finish by pointing to avenues for future research. Starting with externalist 
arguments against relativism, a recurring theme is that, while externalism promises to 
undercut some central arguments for relativism, the relativist has some moves at their 
disposal. In the case of the argument from circularity, she can insist that it is incumbent 
upon the reliabilist qua theorist to vindicate her beliefs as justified beliefs, and her 
standards as justified standards. The reliabilist may face serious difficulties in doing so, at 
least if the literature on the “bootstrapping” and “easy knowledge” problems is anything to 





to the reliabilist depends on the viability of conciliationism as a response to philosophical 
disagreement. So the outcome of the relativist’s “encounter” with the reliabilist is going to 
depend on the outcome of some central epistemological debates. This suggests that 
relativism (and the relativist) can hardly be regarded as being off the epistemological table. 
 
Turning to ways in which externalism might provide support for (certain forms of) relativism, 
we saw that externalist ideas do arguably provide support for some forms of relativism. The 
key question here is whether these forms of relativism are what the absolutist is really 
concerned to deny. We can of course define “epistemic relativism” in all sorts of ways, but 
the term is generally seen as denoting a view that is threatening to mainstream 
epistemology. It is an open question whether any of the forms of relativism discussed 
constitute such a threat. Perhaps the most interesting idea in this respect is that “we” get to 
determine what “reliable” amounts to. If the view is just that there is some vagueness in the 
idea of a reliable belief-forming process, then it is perhaps not so interesting. If the view is 
that the status of a belief forming process as “reliable” is subject to social negotiation, then 
perhaps it represents the sort of threat to epistemological orthodoxy that is worthy of the 
name “epistemic relativism”. 
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i For an overview of the internalism/externalism distinction see Pappas (2017).  
ii See Baghramian and Carter (2015) for a comprehensive discussion. See also Carter (2016, 
Ch. 2). 
iii This is not to say that the only things that matter for whether a belief is justified are things 
beyond what is reflectively accessible to one. 
iv This is one common way to capture the view. But one might also be an externalist about 
epistemic justification because one denies a different version of epistemic internalism called 
“mentalism” (see Conee and Feldman 2004). Mentalist interests hold that what matters for 
epistemic justification are factors internal to one’s mental life; captured as a supervenience 
thesis, the claim is that justification supervenes exclusively on internal factors, which are 
understood as mental states. An externalist who denies mentalist internalism is best 
understood not as denying that what matters for justification must be accessible by 
reflection, but rather, as denying that (in short), necessarily, mental duplicates are 
justificational duplicates.   
v The locus classicus is Goldman (1979). 
vi For helpful discussion on this point, see Stroud (2008) and Sosa (2011). 
vii A response to this strand of argument is developed in detail in Sosa (1997).  
viii For an influential presentation and criticism of this argument, see Boghossian (2006). 
ix For a more recent defence of this argumentative strategy, see Hales (2014). For critical 
discussion of this argument strategy, see Siegel (2011) and Carter (2016, Ch. 4; 
forthcoming). 
x For one thing, it is unclear that the reasoning here favours relativism over scepticism. See 
Carter (2016, Ch. 4). 
xi See Siegel (2011) for an attribution of this implicit premise to Rorty. 
xii For an overview of the epistemology of disagreement see Frances and Matheson (2018). 
xiii What follows is based on Kornblith (ms.), though his discussion is more sophisticated than 
what we say here. 
xiv Modulo views on which it is impossible for two individuals to be aware of precisely the 
same evidence. 
xv For more on psychologism see Kusch (2015). 
xvi For both problems see Cohen (2002). 
